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NOTES
Antitrust: Harold's v. Dillard: It Takes Two to Tango
Except in Oklahoma: The Tenth Circuit Interprets
Oklahoma Antitrust Law to Reach Unilateral Activity
L Introduction
The businessman tends to view our antitrust laws with restrained
enthusiasm. In principle, he reluctantly acknowledges that he should
favor their provisions; but, as a principal, he seldom displays any
fondness for their prohibitions. He admits that he must live with this
legislation, for better or for worse, yet he finds it difficult to return its
embrace with any degree of affection.'
The Sherman Antitrust Act provides the general principles defining American
antitrust policy, promoting competition, and restricting monopolistic behavior.2
These principles restrict at times and liberate at others, thus creating the
businessperson's "restrained enthusiasm." The Oklahoma Antitrust Act substantially parallels the Sherman Act but differs in the scope of activities affected. Section
1 of the Sherman Act prohibits only contracts, combinations or conspiracies in
restraint of trade.' The Oklahoma Antitrust Act, in contrast, provides that "every
act...in restraint of trade" is illegal."
In Harold'sStores, Inc. v. DillardDepartment Stores, Inc.,' the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals considered, as a matter of first impression, whether the
Oklahoma Antitrust Act prohibits unilateral acts in restraint of trade. By holding
that Oklahoma law does reach unilateral activity, the court recognized a break
from federal precedent interpreting the seemingly less restrictive Sherman Act.
As a result, the court defined a new state antitrust standard with potentially farreaching effects. Those ramifications include the possibility of increased antitrust
litigation as courts apply Oklahoma's narrower, yet arguably more equitable,
statute. In addition, the Harold'sdecision creates a unique antitrust environment
for the businessperson operating in or considering Oklahoma. This note examines

1. JERROLD G. VAN CISE, THE FEDERAL ANTrTRuST LAWS 1 (1967).
2. See EARL V. KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND
RELATED STATUTES 7 (1978).

3. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
4. 79 OKLA. STAT. § 1 (1991) (emphasis added).
5. 82 F.3d 1533 (10th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 117 S. Ct. 297 (1996).
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the Harold's case, the substance and backgrounds of the Federal and Oklahoma

antitrust statutes, and future implications of the decision.
II. Law Priorto the Case
A. The Sherman Act

The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 represents the federal government's original
attempt to promote legitimate and healthy competition in interstate commerce."
The Supreme Court has characterized it as a "charter of freedom [with a]
generality and adaptability comparable to that found desirable in constitutional
provisions"! As a result of that expansive construction, the Sherman Act has

remained substantially intact since its inception.' The substantive provisions of
the Act are sections 1 and 2.'

Section 1 provides that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several

States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal."'" To restrain
trade, an act must "prejudice public interests by unduly restricting competition,
or unduly obstructing the due course of trade, or . . .injuriously restrain[ing]

trade."" Section l's requirement of concerted activity signals its focus on
restrictive agreements."

Section 2 creates liability for "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to

monopolize any part of the trade or commerce. "" Courts define monopoly power
as the power to control prices or exclude competition." A plaintiff may recover

upon proof that the defendant possesses monopoly power in the relevant market
and willfully acquired or maintained that power.'" Unlike section 1, section 2 can

apply to a single entity's activity. Unilateral activity, as a result, receives a more

6. See In re Grand Jury, 62 F. 840, 841 (N.D. Cal. 1894). It should be noted that the Interstate
Commerce Commission, created in 1887, was the first legislative endeavor to protect competitive
markets. The Commission was responsible for assuring just and reasonable railroad rates. The Sherman
Act was the first attempt to regulate the whole of interstate commerce. See ERNEST GELLHORN,
ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS INA NUTSHELL 16 (1986).
7. Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623,647 n.5 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933), rev'd on other grounds,
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984)).
8. Congress has increased the fines and criminal penalties under the Act. See KINTNER, supra note
2, at 7.
9. See 15 U.S.C. §!§ 1-2 (1994).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
11. Crown Paint Co, v. Bankston, 640 P.2d 948, 950 (Okla. 1981).
12. See generally United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) (construing section 1 to
require a plurality of actors).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
14. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
15. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
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permissive scrutiny because liability arises only when a firm's market power could

create a dangerous probability of monopolization. 6
The dual nature of the Sherman Act creates a "gap" in coverage which has been
recognized by the United States Supreme Court 7 and critiqued by commentators." Section 1 requires two actors and deals with restraints of trade which
are the result of contract, combination or conspiracy. Section 2 reaches unilateral
activity only when the offending entity has sufficient market power to constitute
a monopoly or a credible attempt to monopolize. Consequently, the Act does not
reach trade restraints by single entities that do not possess or immediately threaten
to possess monopoly power.'
The gap created by the Sherman Act remains untouched as courts refuse to
narrow its scope." Commentators suggest that courts inexplicably regard the gap

"as an important principle in antitrust policy."'" When considering the gap in
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,' the Supreme Court declared

that Section 2 of the Sherman Act and 15 U.S.C. § 45 were adequate to control
dangerous unilateral anticompetitive conduct. ' Title 15 U.S.C. § 45, also known
as section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,' prohibits unfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive practices in or affecting commerce. Despite
the Court's pronouncement in Copperweld, however, 15 U.S.C. § 45 has not been
used to reach nonconcerted restraints of trade.' Though it would seem to cover

trade restraints caused by unilateral and concerted activity, 15 U.S.C. § 45 has not
been so applied.'

16. See Thomas W. McNamara, Defining a Single Entityfor Purposes of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act Post Copperweld: A Suggested Approach, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1245, 1248 (1985).
17. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 774-75 (1984).
18. In fact, the gap was discussed in a law review article as early as 1950, forty-five years before
its recognition by the Supreme Court. See James A. Rahl, Conspiracyand the Anti-Trust Laws, 44 ILL.
L. REV. 743, 744-46 (1950).
19. See Glen 0. Robinson, Explaining Vertical Agreements: The Colgate Puzzle and Antitrust
Method, 80 VA. L. REv 577, 593 (1994).
20. See id.
21. Id. at 593.

22. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
23. See id. at 777.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 58 (1994).
25. See id. § 45(a)(1).
26. See Robinson, supra note 19, at 593.
27. See id. (citing Russel Stover Candies, Inc. v. FTC, 718 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1983)). Russel Stover
provides a thorough discussion regarding the vitality of the single entity defense. In Russel Stover, the
Federal Trade Commission originally brought a 15 U.S.C. § 45 action against Russel Stover for illegal
price fixing. See In re Russel Stover Candies, 100 F.T.C. 1, 2-3 (1982). The FTC did not, however,
argue that 15 U.S.C. § 45 prohibited unilateral activity. See id. at 18-19. Instead, the FTC deferred to
a 15 U.S.C. § I analysis, accompanied by the plurality of actors requirement. See id.
The Eighth Circuit
discussed in detail the viability of the plurality of actors requirement, but left the responsibility of
rejecting it to the Supreme Court. See Russel Stover, 718 F.2d at 260. The Russel Stover cases symbolize
courts' hesitancy to apply 15 U.S.C. § 45 to bridge the gap.
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B. The Oklahoma Antitrust Act

In article 5, section 44, the Oklahoma Constitution grants the state legislature
the power to "define what is an unlawful combination, monopoly, trust, act or
agreement, in restraint of trade" and enact laws to punish persons engaged in any
such activity. The legislature exercised that power through the Oklahoma
Antitrust Act.2
The first section of the Oklahoma Antitrust Act practically duplicates section
1 of the Sherman Act except for the addition of the words "act" and "agreement"
to the list of activities that could restrain trade.29 Section 1 of the Oklahoma act
provides: "Every act, agreement, contract, or combination in the form of trust, or
otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce within this state is
hereby declared to be against public policy and illegal."3
In previous cases, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has recognized section 1 of the
Oklahoma Antitrust Act as the statutory equivalent?' to section 1 of the Sherman
Act and has acknowledged the analogous relationship between the two?2
Moreover, Oklahoma courts rely on judicial interpretation of the Sherman Act in
applying the Oklahoma Antitrust Act.3 In Teleco, Inc. v. Ford Industries,' the

Oklahoma Supreme Court described federal precedent as "particularly useful in
interpreting section 1 of title 79 (the Oklahoma Antitrust Act), as those two
sections are virtually identical."35
The similarities in the Oklahoma and federal statutes end, however, with their
respective first sections. While section 2 of the Sherman Act regulates
monopolies and attempts to monopolize, the Oklahoma legislature declined to
create a measure with similar language. The primary condemnation of monopolies
appears in the Oklahoma Constitution. Article 2, Section 32 states that
"[p]erpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free government,
and shall never be allowed."
C. The Rule of Reason v. The Per Se Test

Courts have long recognized that every agreement and regulation regarding
trade will inevitably restrain trade to some extent.36 If taken literally, section 1
of the Sherman Act and section 1 of the Oklahoma Antitrust Act would make
illegal every possible agreement concerning trade or commerce?7 Consequently,

28. See John F. Fi3cher, II, Antitrust Law in Oklahoma, 48 OKLA. B.J. 413, 418 (1977).
29. See 79 OKLA. STAT. § 1 (1991).

30. Id.
31. See Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n., 561 P.2d 499,
505 n.13 (Okla. 1977).
32. See Krebsbach v. Henley, 725 P.2d 852, 858 (Okla. 1986).
33. See id. at 857; Oakridge Investments, Inc. v. Southern Energy Homes, Inc., 719 P.2d 848, 850
(Okla. 1986).
34. 587 P.2d 1360 (Okla. 1978).
35. See idL at 1362.

36. See Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
37. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
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both federal and Oklahoma courts have adopted two tests, the "rule of reason" and
the "per se" rule, to determine whether a given activity constitutes an unreasonable and thus illegal restraint of trade.
The United States Supreme Court introduced the "per se" rule in United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc." The Court reserved this rule for activities
which have no legitimate justification and lack any redeeming competitive
purpose. 9 Examples of those activities include: price-fixing,4" division of
markets,4 group boycotts,42 and tying arrangements.43 The courts view activities governed by the "per se" rule as presumptively anticompetitive and
illegal."
When the "per se" rule is not applicable, courts default to the "rule of reason"
test. In Chicago Boardof Trade v. United States,45 Justice Brandeis provided this
oft-cited definition for the rule of reason:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether
it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine
that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to
the business to which the restraint is applied....
When applying the rule of reason, courts consider whether the activity promotes
or restrains competition in light of its history, potential evil and purpose.47 For
a restraint of trade to be unreasonable, the restraint must have a detrimental effect
on more than just the plaintiffs business.' In other words, a party can not
successfully bring an antitrust action against another party just because the
defendant has taken business or market share away from the plaintiff. Rather, the
conduct must injure competition.
III. Harold's v. Dillard
Harold'spresented a novel application of the rule of reason test. By concluding
that the Oklahoma Antitrust Act reaches unilateral activity, the Harold's court
created an opportunity to apply the rule of reason test to a single entity's conduct.
This decision represents a split from federal law and the creation of a unique
antitrust environment for Oklahoma.

38. 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940).
39. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 395 (1927).
See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).
See Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale-Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 399 (1947).
See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
246 U.S. 231 (1918).
Id.at 238.
See id.
See Krebsbach v. Henley, 725 P.2d 852, 858 n.18 (Okla. 1986).
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A. A Tale of 37,000 Skirts

On May 10, 1993, Harold's executives learned that Dillard stores were offering
for sale skirts with fabric patterns identical to skirts Harold's had sold during the
1991 to 1992 sales seasonY' Dillard offered the skirts for sale at less than half
of Harold's prices.!'
Harold's filed sut on July 6, 1993, claiming Dillard violated the Copyright Act,
the Oklahoma Antitrust Act, and the Oklahoma Unfair Sales Act." Regarding
the Oklahoma Antitrust Act, Harold's argued that Dillard's unilateral acts of
copyright infringement and sales below cost unreasonably restrained trade. 2
Harold's made no attempt to prove that Dillard acted in concert with any other
entity. 3
Dillard stipulated that its merchandise managers obtained nineteen of Harold's
copyrighted print fabrics and arranged for manufacture of 37,000 skirts which
infringed Harold's' copyrights.' At trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of
Harold's on all three claims and awarded Harold's $372,000 in damages. 5
B. Issue
Both parties appealed on several issues.56 The issue germane to this note was
Dillard's claim that Harold's failed to establish an Oklahoma Antitrust Act
violation.' Dillard based that contention, in part, on the claim that the Oklahoma
Antitrust Act requires proof of concerted action, not unilateral conduct."
Dillard presented four arguments to support the requirement of concerted
action. First, Dillard stated that no Oklahoma case law sustained the position that
section 1 of the Oklahoma Antitrust Act can be violated by unilateral conduct. 9
Second, Dillard cited two early cases which, in Dillard's opinion, held that
Oklahoma courts have required concerted action that restrained trade in order to
violate section 1 of the Oklahoma Antitrust Act.6 Third, Dillard referred to

49. See Harold's Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d 1533, 1539(10th Cir. 1996).
50. See idL Dillard later reduced the prices to less than 15% of Harold's original price. See Id.
51. See id.
52. See id at 1549.
53. See id
54. See id. at 1539.
55. See id at 154). Harold's received $260,220 in damages for the copyright infringement and
$21,780 on the Unfair Sales Act claim. The jury awarded $30,000 on the Antitrust Act claim, which was
trebled to $90,000. Harold's received total damages of $372,000. See id.
56. See id. at 1540-41. Dillard claimed that the district court erred by: (1) concluding that § 301
of the Copyright Act did not preempt Harold's Oklahoma Antitrust Act claim; (2) admitting a survey
submitted by a marketing professor produced by Harold's; and (3) denying its renewal motion for
judgment as a matter of law. Harold's claimed that the district court erred in deciding two attorneys' fees
issues. See id.
57. See id at 1547.
58. See id
59. See Brief for Appellant at 43, Harold's Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d
1533 (10th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-6133, 95-6160).
60. See id at 43-44. Dillard cited Nissen v. Andres, 63 P.2d 47 (Okla. 1936) and Thomas v. Belcher,
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Oklahoma's reliance on the Sherman Act and cases interpreting the Sherman
Act.6' These cases, of course, required concerted action under section 1 of the
Sherman Act. Finally, Dillard proposed that the word "acts" in section 1 of the
Oklahoma Antitrust Act encompassed concerted activity.62
Harold's countered by arguing that the Oklahoma legislature chose a different
statutory construction specifically to reach unilateral conduct. 3 In addition,
Harold's pointed out that the Oklahoma cases cited by Dillard involved
interpretations of the Sherman Act, not the Oklahoma Antitrust Act.' Lastly,
Harold's argued that interpretation of section 1 of the Sherman Act was not
applicable because the statutes were clearly different in at least this one respect."
The word "act", according to Harold's, did not encompass any form of concerted
action.'
C. The Tenth Circuit Court's Opinion
Judge Baldock, writing for the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, recognized that the Oklahoma Supreme Court had not addressed whether
the Oklahoma Antitrust Act prohibited unilateral acts in restraint of trade.'
Nonetheless, the court concluded that the Oklahoma legislature did intend for the
Oklahoma Antitrust Act to reach unilateral conduct." The court, citing Black's
Dictionary for support, found that the ordinary meaning of the word "act"
encompasses unilateral activity 9 .Although Judge Baldock recognized Oklahoma's deference to federal court precedent, the court declined to apply
Sherman Act authority in light of the clear difference in statutory construction."
Moreover, the court refused to second-guess the Oklahoma legislature's decision
to draft the statute to reach unilateral conduct. Judge Baldock stated: "Simply put,
it takes two to tango under § 1 of the Sherman Act, while the plain language of
§ 1 of 1the Oklahoma Antitrust Act reaches unilateral conduct in restraint of
trade.0

87 P.2d 1084 (Okla. 1939).
61. See Brief for Appellant at 44 n.52, Harold's Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc., 82
F.3d 1533 (10th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-6133, 95.6160).
62. See id. at 44.
63. See Brief for Appellee at 33, Harold's Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d
1533 (10th Cir. 1996) (No. 95.6133, 95-6160).
64. See id. at 33-34.
65. See id.
at 34.
66. See id.
67. See Harold's Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d 1533, 1549 (10th Cir. 1996).
68. See id. at 1549-50.
69. See id. at 1550.
70. See id.
71. 1l
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IV. Analysis
On its face, section 1 of the Oklahoma Antitrust Act differs from the Sherman
Act in only one material way: the addition of the word "act" in the Oklahoma
statute. Such a small difference in construction would seem, at first glance,
immaterial. However, the Oklahoma law's extended reach creates a substantial
consideration for businesses, potential plaintiffs, and consumers. A study of the
statutes' backgrounds provides insight as to why they are different.
A. Legislative and HistoricalBackground
1. Sherman Act
A discussion of the difference between the first sections of the Sherman Act
and the Oklahoma Antitrust Act begs the question of why each legislature chose
the language it did. A brief overview of the environments which produced the
two antitrust statutes proves helpful in understanding their differences."
Congress enacted the Sherman Act in 1890 amid a public outcry for action
against trusts.73 Trusts arose following the rapid industrial and economic
expansion of the post-Civil War era.' A laissez-faire government policy towards
corporations resulted in combinations that reduced competition through their
aggregate economic power." Chief Justice White, in Standard Oil Co. v. United
States,76 described the attitudes surrounding the Act's passage:
[T]he main cause which led to the legislation was the thought that it
was required by the economic condition of the times, that is, the vast
accumulation of wealth in the hands of corporations and individuals...
and the widespread impression that their power had been and would be
exerted to oppress individuals and injure the public generally."
Trusts were viewed as monstrous evils which tended to "crush out individual
independence and to hinder or prevent the free use of human faculties and full
development of human character.t" Consequently, the Sherman Act fulfilled a
politically expedient objective" of condemning these combinations."

72. See generally Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50 (1911) (stating that debates may
be used as a means of ascertaining the environment at the time of the enactment of a particular law).
73. See ERNEST GEL.HORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS INA NUTSHELL 18-19 (3d ed. 1986).
74. See KINTNER, supra note 2, at 9.
75. See id.
76. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
77. Id. at 50.
78. W.W. THORNTON, A TREATISE ON THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 237 (1913) (citing Message
by President Grover Cleveland, 9 MESSAGES & PAPERS OF PRESIDENTS 744 (Dec. 7, 1896)).
79. Antimonopoly sentiment was so strong that the final version of the Sherman Act passed both
houses of Congress with only one dissenting vote. See EARL W. KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER I I
(2d ed. 1973).
80. See William L. Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CHIi.L.
REv. 221, 222, 226, 247-49 (1956).
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The Fifty-first Congress created the statute such that unilateral activity that did
not constitute a monopoly was exempt from liability. Historians suggest two main
reasons for this construction. First, the Sherman Act's framers meant to adopt the
common law principles of the day."' The term restraint of trade, as applied by
the common law, always involved situations requiring a plurality of actors." It
seems the legislators prohibited contracts, combinations, and conspiracies because
those were the entities which could, at the time, legitimately restrain trade.
Second, Sherman Act legislators likely did not consider that individual entities
might eventually be able to affect competition as significantly as the trusts and
combinations of the day." At the time of the Sherman Act's enactment, the
effects of the Industrial Revolution were not fully realized and few individuals
had the ability or means to influence market forces.' As one commentator
suggested, "[t]he danger perceived was the concern of the law." 5 In fact, during
Congressional debates prior to the bill's passage, a Senator proposed to limit 15
U.S.C. § 2 (the portion of the Sherman Act condemning monopolies) to concerted
combinations or conspiracies to monopolize, thus corresponding to the "contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy" requirement of section 186 The motion
failed."
It should be noted that, despite the criticism of trusts, Congress stopped short
of denouncing corporations. To the contrary, Senator Sherman extolled their
virtues and promoted their value to the public: "The combination of labor and
capital in the form of a corporation to carry on any lawful business is a proper
and useful expedient, especially for great enterprises of a quasi public character,
and ought to be encouraged and protected as tending to cheapen the cost of
production .... ""
2. The Oklahoma Antitrust Act
It can safely be stated that the Oklahoma legislature held no similar fondness
for corporations. While no formal legislative history exists for Oklahoma statutes,
an understanding of the public attitude at the time of passage may shed light on
why section 1 of the Oklahoma Antitrust Act is more restrictive than the Sherman
Act.
The Oklahoma Antitrust Act passed in 1907, the year of statehood and creation
of the Oklahoma Constitution. The Oklahoma Constitutional Convention reflected
the prevailing populist sentiment of the day." "[U]nquestionably the dominant
81. See 21 CONG. REc. S2456 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman) ("It [the
Sherman Antitrust Act] does not announce a new principle of law, but applies old and well recognized
principles of the common [aw to the complicated jurisdiction of our State and Federal Government.").
82. See James A. Rahl, Conspiracyand the Anti-Trust Laws, 44 U. ILL. L. REV. 743,745-46 (1950).
83. See id. at 746-47.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See id. at 746.
Id. at 747.
See 21 CONG. REC. S3152 (daily ed. April 8, 1890) (statement of Sen. Gray).
See id.
21 CONG. REc. S2457 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
See Larry Derryberry & Patrick D. Shore, Public Utility Regulation in Oklahoma: An Historical
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political philosophy of the new state envisioned a democratic equality of
opportunity protected by governmental process against corporate and monied
interests."' The Oklahoma Constitution, a document known for its "legendary"
antibusiness character,"' reflects this attitude.
Articles 9 and 10 of the Oklahoma Constitution embody the Convention's
hostility toward corporations. The laundry list of restrictions on corporations
included, among other things, prohibition of corporations owning rural land, being
exempted from property taxes, and making political contributions."' The State
of Oklahoma could not invest in private enterprise, grant tax exemptions for
corporations, or release corporations from indebtedness. 3 Moreover, the State
of Oklahoma reserved the right to change or revoke any corporation's charter
whenever "it [the corporation] may be injurious to the citizens of this State." 4
These measures all reflect the State's attempt "to create a commonwealth for
the poor man."95 The added scope of the Oklahoma Antitrust Act, when set
against this backdrop, is more easily understood as an extension of the pervasive
corporate guspicion defining the State's political attitude at the time.
B. Future Implications
1. When Does the Oklahoma Antitrust Act Apply?
To best recognize the future significance of the Harold's decision, it is important to understand if, and when, the Oklahoma Antitrust Act applies. As a general
rule, state antitrust law applies to commerce which takes place completely within
a state."' The Sherman Act governs when the "activity is itself in interstate
commerce or, if it is local in nature .... has an effect on some other appreciable

activity demonstrably in interstate commerce."97 If both intrastate and interstate
commerce are involved, the Sherman Act does not preempt state jurisdiction over
the intrastate activity." Determining the applicable law proves especially
important due to the Oklahoma Antitrust Act's broader focus.

Perspective, 19 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 465, 466 (1994).
90. Maurice H. Memil, The Administrative Law of Oklahoma, 4 OKLA. L. REV 286, 287 (1951).
91. Dennis W. Arrow, Representative Government and Popular Distrust: The Obstruction/
Facilitation Conundrum Rfgarding State ConstitutionalAmendment By Initiative Petition, 17 OKLA. CITY
U. L. REV. 5,70 (1992).
92. See Robert H. Henry, Preface to IRVING L. FAUGHT, OKLAHOMA BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS,
FORMATION AND REPRESENTATION xi-xii (1995).
93. See id.
94. OKLA. CONST. art. IX, § 47. The original draft of the Constitution provided that any corporation
that removed state court deisions to federal court would lose its charter. See Robert H. Henry, Preface
to IRVING L.FAUGHT, OKLAHOMA BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, FORMATION AND REPRESENTATION Xi-Xii
(1995).
95. FEDERAL WORKS AGENCY, OKLAHOMA, A GUIDE TO THE SOONER STATE 30 (1941).
96. See State v. Jack, 76 P. 911, 915 (Kan. 1904), affd, 199 U.S. 372 (1905).
97. McLain v. Real Estate Bd., Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 242 (1980).
98. See Jack, 76 P. at 915-16.
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2. Activities Which Receive Different Treatment Under the Oklahoma
Antitrust Act
In light of the differences in the two statutes, the obvious question becomes:

What activities are now illegal in Oklahoma that might not be under the Sherman
Act? Harold'spresents the most apparent example. The Harold'scourt found that

Dillard violated section 1 of the Oklahoma Antitrust Act by (1) infringing
Harold's' copyrights, (2) in restraint of trade." Had the case arisen under the
Sherman Act, regardless of whether Dillard's actions actually restrained trade,
Dillard would not have faced federal antitrust liability. Section 1 of the Sherman
Act would not apply because Dillard acted unilaterally. Likewise, section 2 of the

Sherman Act would not apply because Dillard did not have the market power to
create a dangerous probability of monopolization.

Consequently, Dillard

encountered a higher level of scrutiny because its activity affected Oklahoma
intrastate commerce.

In addition to the scenario presented in Harold's, certain types of vertical
restrictions, including resale price maintenance arrangements, might receive
different treatment under the tougher Oklahoma rule." Resale price main-

tenance involves an agreement between parties in the distribution process which
has a price-constraining effect.'"' A supplier may refuse to deal with any
customer who fails to comply with the supplier's terms. The United States
Supreme Court declared these resale price arrangements per se illegal in Dr.Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co."ai The per se prohibition of resale
price maintenance has been limited to the actual setting of retail prices or price
levels."3 Nonprice vertical restrictions, such as territorial divisions, are not per

se illegal, but are instead subject to a rule of reason inquiry."' Further, it should
be noted that any type of vertical restriction must have a detrimental effect on

interbrand competition'" in order to be illegal."

99. See Harold's Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d 1533, 1544 (10th Cir. 1996).
100. Vertical restraints are imposed by the seller on the buyer (or vice versa) or on what is called
the vertical relationship. Manufacturers and dealers are the parties which usually make up a vertical
relationship.
101. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761-63 (1984); United States v.
Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 302-03 (1919).
102. 220 U.S. 373, 404-09 (1911).
103. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 735-36 (1988).
104. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,57-59 (1977). Sylvania presented
a new, economics-based analysis which focused on the difference between interbrand and intrabrand
competition. The Court recognized that the benefits of enhancing interbrand competition outweigh
limitations on intrabrand rivalry. As a result, the court set up a two part standard for determining whether
the rule of reason standard has been satisfied: (1) whether the arrangement is likely to have a permanent
effect on interbrand competition, and (2) whether the restraint has "redeeming virtues." Id. at 54-57.
105. Interbrand competition is the competition among the manufacturers of the same generic product
and is the primary concern of antitrust law. Intrabrand competition is the competition between the
wholesale or retail distributors of the product of a particular manufacturer. See id. at 52 n.19.
106. See id.
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In United States v. Colgate & Co., w the Supreme Court created an exception
to Dr. Miles for unilaterally imposed price restraints by requiring some form of
agreement between the manufacturer and another party to render the arrangement
illegal.l" Under the Colgate rule, a supplier can unilaterally set resale prices
without violating the Sherman Act by announcing those prices and terminating
dealers that do not comply. The Court stated that the Sherman Act "does not
restrict the long recognized right of [a] trader or manufacturer engaged in an
entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to
parties with whom he will deal.''
In Colgate, the Court distinguished between unilateral and concerted activity
and prohibited only the latter. Critics describe this distinction as inexplicable and
the Court's subsequent treatment of the Colgate doctrine expresses their own
dissatisfaction with it.' As a result, the Court has attempted to circumvent the
concerted activity requirement by "show[ing] great creativity in finding the
requisite agreement or other concerted action."' Nevertheless, the Colgate
requirement of concerted activity remains, and unilateral price restraints survive
federal antitrust scrutiny."2
Under the Oklahoma Antitrust Act, however, the concerted activity safety net
disappears. A manufacturer who terminated a supply relationship with a dealer
might face an antitrust suit even if no agreement ever existed. For example,
Nissen v. Andres,' an early Oklahoma case decided under the Sherman Act,
might have been resolved differently under state law."4 In Nis~en, a group of
ice dealers refused to deal with a certain retailer."' The Oklahoma Supreme
Court found no conspiracy between the wholesalers, and thus no violation under
the Sherman Act."6 Today, the more restrictive Oklahoma statute might attach
liability for the unilateral refusal to deal.
The aforementioned examples present two avenues for potential litigation
resulting from the Harold's decision. Whether plaintiffs take advantage of them
remains to be seen, but Harold'shas set the stage for a more litigious antitrust
environment in Oklahoma.
3. Increased Litigation
Before the Harold'sdecision, potential antitrust plaintiffs probably believed that
the Sherman Act and its judicial interpretation foreclosed any antitrust suit,

107. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).

108. See id. at 307.
109. Id.
110. See Glen 0. Robinson, Explaining Vertical Agreements: The Colgate Puzzle and Antitrust
Method, 80 VA. L. REV. 577, 584-86 (1994).

111. Id. at 589.
112. See Robinson, supra note 19, at 584-86.
113. 63 P.2d 47 (Okla. 1936).
114. See John F. Fischer, II, Antitrust Law in Oklahoma, 48 OKLA. B.J. 413, 418 (1977).

115. See Nissen, 63 P.2d at 48.
116. See id. at51.
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federal or state, against a single entity. Moreover, someone who did suspect that
the Oklahoma law reaches unilateral activity may not have had the resources
necessary to risk verifying that suspicion at trial. Harold's removed that doubt
and, at the very least, removed one obstacle to bringing a state antitrust action.
As a result, plaintiffs may be encouraged to initiate suits that once were
dismissed from consideration because of misconceptions about the Oklahoma
Antitrust Act. At the very least, attorneys can follow Harold's lead and add
antitrust allegations to any petition claiming violations of a trade-protecting
statute.
In addition, Oklahoma law gives plaintiffs two more monetary incentives to add
an antitrust claim. Under title 79, section 25 of the Oklahoma Statutes, a
successful antitrust plaintiff can recover treble damages and the cost of the suit,
including attorney's fees." 7 Federal law provides the same inducements."' The
treble damage provision serves to deter antitrust violations and to provide
incentive for private parties to instigate costly and uncertain litigation, thus
supplementing governmental enforcement."'
Inherent with these incentives exists the possibility of frivolotis or misdirected
suits." In the majority opinion in Copperweld, Chief Justice Burger stated that
eliminating the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine would "simply eliminate treble
'
damages from private state tort suits masquerading as antitrust actions."'
Harold's, in a sense, accomplished the opposite. Oklahoma plaintiffs can now
receive treble damages for attaching an antitrust claim that might not have been
added before Harold'swas decided.
In fact, Harold'spresents an interesting example. Opponents of the Harold's
court interpretation of the Oklahoma Antitrust Act might argue that Harold's could
have found relief without the antitrust claim. One could suggest that Harold's
received adequate compensation under its copyright infringement and Unfair Sales
Act claims.'" The antitrust claim added $90,000 to what might be considered
an otherwise satisfactory judgment. It is this type of situation that Chief Justice
Burger predicted in Copperweld.. An interpretation of the Oklahoma Antitrust Act
that awards unnecessary damages, according to this argument, can have only a
negative effect on the judicial system.
However, an effective rebuttal suggests that antitrust law exists to protect a
different interest than, for example, a copyright law. As pointed out in the
Harold'sopinion, "the 'restraint of trade' element of 79 Okla. Stat. § 1 supplies
the 'extra element' that qualitatively distinguishes an Oklahoma Antitrust Act

117. See 79 OKLA. STAT. § 25 (1991).
118. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1994).
119. See Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659, 667 (5th Cir. 1974).
120. See 2 PHILLp AREEDA & HERBERT HOvENKAMP, AN-rrRtJsT LAw I 355b2, at 181-82 (1978);
Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J.White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust Litigation, 74 GEo. L.J.
1001, 1048-49.
121. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984).
122. See supra note 55.
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claim from a claim for copyright infringement under the Copyright Act. '1' The
survival of the antitrust claim, therefore, remains necessary to prevent injury to
competition. Moreover, the antitrust claim's validity hinges upon a rule of reason
analysis. This judicfal inspection safeguards against attachment of frivolous
antitrust claims.
The two perspectives present another example of the fine line that separates
effective and excessive regulation. Striking an appropriate balance greatly affects
the judicial system, and, viewed in a different way, businesses located in or
considering Oklahoma.
4. Effect on Oklahoma Businesses
The potential effects on business resulting from the Harold's decision were
discussed, curiously enough, in a case interpreting the Sherman Act. In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., u the United States Supreme Court
confronted whether a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary are
capable of conspiring in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court
decided the entities could not conspire, and in so doing provided a detailed
discussion of the distinction between concerted and independent action."' The
Copperweld majority and dissenting opinions present an excellent backdrop for
discussing the differences between the Sherman Act and the Oklahoma Antitrust
Act.
(a) The Argument Against the Harold'sDecision
In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Burger cited a number of reasons that the
Sherman Act's framers struck an appropriate balance in the regulation of
concerted and unilateral conduct. In fact, the majority considered the difference
in potential harm between the two types of conduct to be "readily appreciated."'"
It is not enough that a single firm appears to "restrain trade" unreasonably, for even a vigorous competitor may leave that impression.
For instance, an efficient firm may capture unsatisfied customers from
an inefficient rval, whose own ability to compete may suffer as a
result. This is the rule of the marketplace and is precisely the sort of
competition that promotes the consumer interests that the Sherman Act
aims to foster. J1n part because it is sometimes difficult to distinguish
robust competition from conduct with long-run anticompetitive effects,
Congress authorized Sherman Act scrutiny of single firms only when
they pose a danger of monopolization. Judging unilateral conduct in

123.
124.
125.
126.

Harold's Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Dept Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d 1533, 1544 (10th Cir. 1996).
467 U.S. 752 (1984).
Id. at 767-77.
Id. at 768.
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this manner reduces the risk that the antitrust laws will dampen the
competitive zeal of a single aggressive entrepreneur.'27
Regarding intra-enterprise conspiracy, the Copperweldmajority rationalized that
coordination between a corporation and its division should not be regulated by
section 1 because it does not represent a sudden joining of two independent
sources of economic power." To punish coordinated conduct would discourage
corporations from creating divisions, which might deprive consumers of more
efficient production."a The Court judged concerted behavior more sternly
because it deprives the marketplace of the independent decision making that
competition demands."' 3 The Court reasoned that the anticompetitive potential
of concerted behavior deserves Sherman Act scrutiny even if no potential
monopoly exists.'
In addition, the majority opinion recognized the gap' in Sherman Act
coverage and declared that Congress created it "for eminently sound reasons."'3
Single firms, Chief Justice Burger opined, would be subject to judicial scrutiny
for every action if section 1 encompassed unilateral activity.' 3' Such rigorous
regulation would defeat the competitive spirit which the Sherman Act was
designed to foster. 3 Moreover, the majority pointed to section 2 of the
Sherman Act and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act"3 as
safeguards to bridge the gap.'37
Application of Chief Justice Burger's opinion to section 1 of the Oklahoma
Antitrust Act provides at least three objections to the regulation of unilateral
activity: (1) the difficulty in distinguishing vigorous competition from conduct
with long-run anticompetitive effects; (2) the harmful effect on the "competitive
zeal" of a single aggressive entrepreneur that the Sherman Act was supposed to
protect; and (3) the absence of a sudden consolidation of two previously
autonomous sources of economic power.
At a time when Oklahoma's per capita income falls well below the national
average 3 ' and the state's brightest college graduates consistently leave the

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 767-68 (footnote omitted).
See id. at 770-71.
See id. at 771.
See id. at 769.
See id,

132. See supra text accompanying notes 17-27.

133. Copperweld,467 U.S. at 775.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 768.
136. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994).
137. See Copperweld, 467 U.S at 777; supra text accompanying notes 20-27.
138. See John Perry, Candidates Target Deficit Low Wages, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 9, 1996, at
6 (quoting Robert Dauffenbach, director of University of Oklahoma's Center for Economic and
Management Research).
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state,'39 Oklahoma hrdly needs another disincentive for existing local businesses
or firms considering locating in the state.
This measure, if considered to be bad for business, would not be the first state
law to hold that title. As previously discussed, Oklahoma's antibusiness history
is well established.' 4 However, at least in one instance, the legislature has
recognized a statuto.y handicap and worked to correct it.
Oklahoma's original corporate law, as set out by the Constitution, was highly
restrictive and protective.' Consequently, these policies "caused Oklahoma to
lag dangerously behind other states in economic development policy."'4 2 The antibusiness nature of these statutes was gradually eased and finally eliminated in
1986, when the Oklahoma legislature adopted the General Corporation Act.4 "
This act mirrors the Delaware General Corporation Law, whose probusiness
provisions have helped Delaware become the preeminent state in corporate law
matters.'"
Oklahoma has proven its ability to recognize and change, albeit slowly, law
which inhibits corporate involvement in Oklahoma. With respect to the Oklahoma
Antitrust Act, the question is now whether the difference in statutory construction
will produce detrimental effects so severe that the statute should be changed.
Most likely, it will not. Firms considering where to locate clearly do not base
their decision solely on a state's antitrust law. Nevertheless, the more restrictive
statute provides one more disincentive for businesses to locate in Oklahoma. The
statute's full effect might not be realized until subsequent cases applying Harold's
bring the difference in federal and state law to the attention of those considering
Oklahoma.
(b) The Argument in Favor of the Harold's Decision
In his Copperweld dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the section 1 plurality
of actors requirement has no economic significance.' 5 He argued that unilateral
conduct by a firm with market power has as much, or more, anticompetitive
potential than concerted activity.' "From a competitive standpoint, a decision
of a single firm posSessing power to reduce output and raise prices above competitive levels has the same consequence as a decision by two firms acting
together who have acquired an equivalent amount of market power'4 7 through
139. See John Perry, Loss of College Grads Hurting State Economy, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 8,

1996, at 1.
140. See supra text zeccompanying notes 89-95.
141. See supra text ccompanying notes 92-95.
142. Robert H. Henry, Preface to IRVING L. FAUGHT, OKLAHOMA BUSINESS ORGANIzATIONS,
FORMATION AND REPRESENTATION xii (1995).
143. 18 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1001-1144 (1991).
144. See

IRVING

L. FAUGHT,

OKLAHOMA

BUSINESS

ORGANIZATIONS,

FORMATION

AND

REPRESENTATION § 1.2 (1995).
145. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 790 (1984)(Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
146. See id. at 789-90.
147. Market power i,; the ability to raise prices above those that would be charged in a competitive
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an agreement not to compete."'" Justice Stevens asserted that market power, not
the number of people involved, is the operative variable in examining restraints
of trade. 4"
In effect, Justice Stevens argued for an interpretation of the Sherman Act which
would operate very much like the Oklahoma Antitrust Act. Justice Stevens' view
places the emphasis on the ability of unilateral or concerted activity to affect
competition. A party unreasonably restraining trade would not avoid liability
solely because it did not enter into an agreement to do so with another party.
Thus, the Oklahoma statute and Justice Stevens' interpretation close the gap left
by the Copperweld majority because they prevent firms from escaping liability
solely because they do not possess monopoly power.
The Harold's decision fulfills Justice Stevens' call for removing an ineffectual
distinction between unilateral and concerted activity - at least in Oklahoma. As
a result, the Oklahoma Antitrust Act may be viewed as a positive incentive for
businesses evaluating Oklahoma. Firms can benefit from the statute because it
develops a level playing field for businesses of all sizes. As evidenced by
Harold's,the statute provides special protection against unreasonable barriers to
entry that might be created by larger firms."' 5 The resulting business environment potentially benefits consumers through lower prices and increased selection.
The Oklahoma Antitrust Act creates such an environment because it allows
courts to more precisely apply the rule of reason. The statute permits courts to
decide whether unilateral activity unreasonably restrains trade. The Sherman Act's
"contract, combination, or conspiracy" requirement removes unilateral activity
from a court's consideration. Moreover, the Sherman Act's drafters created this
restriction because its drafters did not believe that a single entity could affect
competition in the same way as the trusts of the day.' Over time, though, this
outdated assumption has lost its practicality. Consequently, the Sherman Act
prevents a court from considering a single actor that might not have monopoly
power but does have the ability to unreasonably restrain trade.
The Oklahoma Antitrust Act, on the other hand, prevents any gap in coverage
for single firms that do not have monopoly power. Oklahoma courts cannot
automatically dismiss all unilateral activity - but must apply the rule of reason
to both types of activity. In essence, the Oklahoma law provides essentially the

market. See id. at 789 n.19.
148. Id. at 789-90.
149. See ia. at 789.
150. See id. at 1549. In its opinion, the court cited the opinion testimony of one Dr. Murry, an
economics professor at the University of Oklahoma:
[I]f a company ... can essentially take the intellectual property of another company, or
take the copyrights ... it sends a signal to anybody else that wants to enter this market,
that if you come in here, you're going to get squashed because this big company will
exercise its power and take your copyrights. In that regard, in economics, we would say
it raises a barrier to entry. That itself is anti-competitive. That... is an unreasonable
restraint of trade.
Id.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 81-85.
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same protection afforded by the Sherman Act, except that it provides an arguably
more complete protection - both against parties who have combined to restrain
trade and a single entity with the ability to restrain trade on its own.
Consequently, potential businesses may view Oklahoma's antitrust law as a
valuable aid to competition and commercial development. The next step, then, is
efficient enforcement by Oklahoma courts.
C. Where Do Courts Look for Guidance When Applying the Rule of Reason to
UnilateralActivity?
The Harold'sdecision provides a starting point for parties and attorneys who
are trying to predict whether a unilateral restraint of trade is unreasonable. In
Harold's, the court looked to Oklahoma precedent set in cases dealing with
concerted activity." The court focused on an activity's effect on competition
in general.'"
The fundamental test of the reasonableness of an action, which, by its
nature, restrains trade, is its effect on the public. To amount to an unreasonable restraint of trade the anticompetitive conduct must have an
effect greater than its effect upon the plaintiffs business. .

.

.An

antitrust plaintiff must show that the challenged conduct adversely
impacts competition in general because "the antitrust laws ...

were

enacted for the protection of competition, not competitors.""
When determining reasonableness, a court must first determine the relevant
market"5 and then determine whether an unreasonable restraint exists in that
market." The reascnableness test includes a balancing of the restraint against
the public's and the individual's need and entitlement to free commerce and the
necessity of the restraint to protect and effectuate the basic transaction." Thus,
when confronting unilateral activity, a court must place special emphasis on
finding a restraint of trade that affects more than just the plaintiffs business. A
court should pay special attention to this requirement in order to prevent
unjustified treble damage awards for suits that are more appropriately tort or
contract suits.

152. See Harold's Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d 1533, 1548-49. (10th Cir.

1996).
153. See id. at 1548.
154. Id. (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977)).
155. A relevant market is defined by two elements: (1) the relevant geographical territorial area
involved; and (2) a relevant product market the type or area of goods or services in which the product
which is subject to the reatraint effectively competes. See Teleco, Inc. v. Ford Indus., 587 P.2d 1360,
1364 (Okla. 1978).
156. See id
157. See Cooper'v. Tanaka, 591 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978).
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V. Conclusion

The Tenth Circuit's decision in Harold's that the Oklahoma Antitrust Act
reaches unilateral activity is not likely to create an avalanche of new state
antitrust litigation. It does, however, create opportunities for increased regulation
and restriction on Oklahoma businesses and, at the same time, a fairer playing
field for those businesses.
The Oklahoma Constitution granted the legislature the right to make the
Oklahoma Antitrust Act as broad or as narrow as it desired.' It is unclear,
however, why the framers made the Oklahoma act's reach broader than its
predecessor, the Sherman Act. The state's antibusiness background provides a
potential explanation of why the statute is more restrictive. Due to the different
construction, the legislature may have, unwittingly or not, bridged the gap in
coverage that was left by the two-pronged Sherman Act. Oklahoma, as a result,
should be able to avoid the judicial confusion and endless commentary that has
accompanied the void in the Sherman Act.
Time will tell, however, whether this holding will "dampen the competitive
zeal" of the state's entrepreneurs. Most likely, any such dampening will not occur
until a few of those entrepreneurs are called into court and introduced to the
concepts of unilateral activity and restraint of trade. The results of that litigation
will determine whether Oklahoma's business environment suffers or improves due
to the Harold's decision.
Eric Scott Smith

158. See OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 44.
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